Cameronians

VJ Day 75th Anniversary – 15 August 2020

VJ Day 75th Anniversary – 15 August 2020

If VE Day on 8 May 1945 was hugely symbolic to all battalions of The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), then VJ Day – Victory over Japan – on 15 August, was even more important for the 1st Battalion. They were serving in India at the outbreak of the war in 1939 and were to remain in that theatre for the whole of the war, seeing some of the heaviest fighting, bearing some of the heaviest casualties, and earning an enduring name for fortitude in the most desperate conditions. Writing to the Commanding Officer the legendary General Sir William (Bill) Slim (later Field Marshal the Viscount Slim of Burma KG) their commander, said:

‘The retreat from Burma in 1942 was as severe an ordeal as any army could be called upon to endure but the British and Indian units of the Burma Corps, fighting, falling back, and turning to fight again and again, lived up to the great traditions of their services.  Unsurpassed among them in stubborn courage and in that unquenchable spirit, which lifts men above fatigue and disaster and is the essence of a Regiment, was the 1st Battalion The Cameronians.

‘Battered, exhausted, hungry, reduced by casualties to a fraction of their strength, they never lost their fighting spirit or their indomitable cheerfulness.  Whether they were six hundred or one hundred, they were always the 1st Battalion The Cameronians’.

The 1st Battalion had been sent to India in 1933, first to Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh, then to Landi Kotal on the Kyber Pass, and then (from 1936) to Barrackpore in Bengal, near Calcutta, and lastly to Secunderabad (in the south). They were there in December 1941 when the war with Japan began following unprovoked attacks on Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong. Towards the end of 1942, after intensive training, the Cameronians were ordered to return to the Northwest Frontier, this time to Quetta, but this was soon rescinded and they embarked instead from Madras bound for Rangoon, the capital of Burma.

1st Cameronians ‘Warrant Officers and Sergeants Mess’ Secunderabad, 1941. Lt-Col W. B. Thomas seated centre, front row.

The Japanese were rampant and the retreat back into India by the British and Indian troops was hard-fought in terrible conditions. Having arrived at full strength, by the time 1st Cameronians marched out of Burma in May 1942 they were reduced to fourteen officer and 120 Other Ranks.

In 1943 it was decided that, with their limited resources, rather than wage full-frontal conflict, the Burma Army would carry out operations behind the Japanese lines. Their object was, by disruptive action, to dislocate the Japanese communications, destroy material, kill as many Japanese as possible and adversely affect his morale. The tactics were to be those of highly organised guerrillas. If the object was to adversely affect the morale of the Japanese it had the opposite effect on the British and Indian troops. Founded by their legendary commander, Major General Orde Wingate, they were officially known as the Long Range Penetration Groups but soon took the name of Chindits, the anglicised name of their symbol: the mythical beasts which stood guard on Buddhist temples.

The Cameronians (like other battalions) were formed into two columns, the 26th commanded by the battalion second in command and the 90th led by the commanding officer. (The numbering was taken from the original numbers of the old Cameronians, the 26th of Foot, and the Perthshire Light Infantry, the old 90th, who were joined in 1881 to form the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles)). The assumption must be that the Commanding Officer had spent much of his previous service in the 2nd Battalion and hence chose to number his column the 90th.

The Regimental History, Volume 3[i], warns us:

The very nature of this operation has made it extremely difficult to write a connected story and impossible to give details of every action. It was not a campaign of big battles, but one of many isolated skirmishes and ambushes in thick jungle country. Companies and even platoons were often split up into small widely separated groups for considerable periods. The War Diary could only be imperfectly kept and no written record was maintained of events other than moves by the Battalion as a whole. Such detailed records as have been written were compiled from memory after the event.

… The many acts of bravery and initiative performed by individuals and small groups of men remain unrecorded and are lost to history.

This, in itself, speaks volumes about the nature of the fighting. War Diaries are usually the first draft of history. The Regimental History goes on:

Only the very toughest and best trained troops were to be employed and all units were to be rigidly combed to eliminate the unfit. Supply was to be from the air, either landed on strips or dropped [by parachute]. It was proposed to seize and to develop air strips on which men, horses and mules and a few light guns could be flown in. The troops were to be as lightly equipped as possible although it was found impracticable to reduce the average load to below about 65 pounds [about 30 kilos].

In addition, of course, a man would have his own personal weapon.

The force comprised three brigades. 1st Cameronians were in 111 Brigade with another British battalion and two Ghurkha battalions. Each column comprised 400 men split into eight platoons. Each column had its own medical officer, chaplain and an RAF officer to coordinate the air supply. Heavy supplies – mortars, ammunition etc – were carried on mules, as were the wounded.

The Brigade was warned that it would be required to cross the River Chindwin and advance back into Burma in early February 1944. On arrival at Silchar it marched the 100 miles across the Naga Hills to its camping area on the Imphal-Tiddim road. They landed in Burma on the night of 10/11 March on a hastily prepared strip sixty miles east of Mawlu. Its orders were to concentrate at Dayu, a march of another 100 miles.

The monsoon broke earlier than usual at the beginning of May and from then on the usual daily rainfall was about four inches a day. The effect was that the ground was thoroughly sodden, streams were in spate, and leeches, mosquitoes and other tormenting insects were abundant everywhere, day and night.

The general hardships of the campaign, combined with the monsoon weather, resulted in a sharp rise in the sick rate, jaundice, malaria and dysentery being the main causes. The average platoon was [eventually] reduced to twenty-five instead of forty-five, and this made it very difficult to find sufficient men for patrols, ambushes, picking up supplies and defensive duties.

…The mud on the hills was indescribable, many of the slopes very steep and the jungle in places almost impenetrable. Moreover the privations of the first three months had left the survivors of the battalion in poor physical condition. Most had lost weight, many were extremely emaciated, and the rough going proved so hard on the feet [which were never dry] that there were very few who were not lame in a few days. Several of the pack animals became unfit for work and had to be destroyed.

… On 1 July [1944] the brigade was warned to advance, with the Cameronians to carry out the initial attack on some high ground held by the enemy in strength.

On receipt of this news the Commanding Officer found himself faced with a very difficult situation. There is a limit to the endurance of even the best troops and in a campaign of this type, in monsoon weather, the pace of physical deterioration is accelerated. Although the spirit may be willing, and troops fit for a defensive role, they may be incapable of further mobile offensive operations. When this time comes it is the duty of their Commander to represent the state of affairs to his superior and, in the judgement of Lieutenant Colonel Henning, the Cameronians had reached that stage. Casualties and sickness had reduced the battalion strength to that of a cadre: there were insufficient trained men to man the supporting weapons [mortars and machine guns] and all ranks were suffering from exhaustion and debility.

It was with great reluctance that the CO reported on 2 July that, in his view, the battalion was unfit for offensive operations. This opinion was accepted by the Brigade Commander.

… On 15 December 1945 members of the 1st Cameronians participated in a unique ceremony when Lieutenant General Senechi Tazachi, commander of the Singapore defences, and other Japanese Generals, Staff Officers and Administrators formally handed over their swords to Lieutenant  Colonel Thomas CBE DSO [who had commanded the battalion during the first Burma campaign in 1942 and who returned to command it again]. The Japanese officer values his sword more than his life and many of these weapons had been in the possession of the same military families for generations. To have had to surrender them to their enemies must have been a humiliation, which in the days of their victories in 1942 no Japanese officer could have thought possible.

It was a singular mark of respect for the Battalion that they were chosen for this honour.

Composite image showing Lt-Col W. B. Thomas CBE DSO taking the surrender of a senior Japanese officer, Kluang, December 1945

The sword of Lieutenant General Senechi Tazachi features in the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) displays at Low Parks Museum, Hamilton.

The Fourteenth Army, led by Slim, became known as The Forgotten Army. We must never forget them, especially on the 75th anniversary of their war. The Commonwealth war memorial at Kohima, the turning point of the Japanese offensive into India in 1944, bears the famous epitaph:

When you go home, tell them of us and say,

For your tomorrow, we gave our today.


[i] The History of The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), Volume III (1933-1946) by Brigadier CN Barclay CBE DSO, Sifton Praed, London 1947.

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Posted: 13/08/2020 by PhilipGrant in #WW2at75, News in General



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